Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 11 (1980), 194–199 Katkov. in his paper, considers the full range of Brentano\ philosophical mterests, which extend from the philosophy of religion to the theory of ~patial and temporal continua, and these he treats in tandem with an account of the main e\ents of Brentano's life. The title oflhe paper-*'The world in which Brentano believed he lived"-is Significant, for Katkov reveals clearly the extent to wh1ch Brentano was still living in a pre-Kant ian world, a world coloured by the thought of the scholastics, and by the music of the Gregonan chant. Indeed the developments in art, science, philosophy and politics uf the last two hundred year!> or so seem to have left Brentano cold. lt is by now part or the stock-in-trade of philosophy that it was Brentano who re-introduced the scholastic concept of intentionality-of the directed ness of our mental acts to their objects-and the associated terminology of intentional objects. Two sorts of questions can be posed of such an issue: hiStorical questions concerning, for example, the precise source-materials whicll Brentano used and the validity of Brentano*s understanding of the scholastic theories: and philosophical questions as to which, if any, of the given theories are true. Klaus Hedwig's paper deals exclusively with the former category. He lays bare for u~ the wide scope of Brentano*s knowledge of lhe scholastic corpus, but shows how Brentano's understanding of the texts is sometim~ marred by hi:. own preconception of the history of philosophy (which is, according to Brentano, a cyclical affair, involving rej:eated rediscovery of and decadent falling away from wbat is, in effect, an Aristotelian truth). Hedwig points out also, that it \\as Brentano*s earlier and more problematic theor) of intentionality as a matter of the 'mental inexistence of an object' which had most influence upon his successors, his later, more mature account received in contrast relative!) lit!lc attention. Herbert Spiegelberg's essay. a study of the extant corrtspondeuce between Brentano and Husserl, demonstrates what has not always been evident from the critical remarks which are to be found in the works of the two philosophers and of their students, that Brentano and Husser! enJoyed *a last ng loyalty and even friendship over more than thiny years' (p.98). Perhaps the m~t philowphically interesting of the issues mentioned in the letters concerns the philosophy of geometry and in particular the possibility of a philosophically adequate foundation of non-Euclidean geometry, which 1S raised in a lener of December 1892. As Speigelberg points out, Husser! had at this point just published volume one of hil> Philosophie der Ari1hmerik (PdA) and had planned, indeed almost completed, a second volume, V~>hich was to have dealt in a similar way with higher mathematical systems, including geometries. As has recently been made clear by Holenstein in his introduction to the new H usserliana edition of volume one of the Logische Uncersuchwtgen, 1t was almost certainly the difficulties which Husserl encountered m his attempt to apply the methods of volume one of PdA to systems of this kind which led him to call into question the validity of 1hõe methods and to develop instead some of the characteristically anti-psychologist1c ideas of his Logische Umersuchungen. The major support for this view is to be round in Husserrs exchanges with Natorp, which throw serious doubt upon the orthodox account of Husserl's development in this period, according to which a crucial role is said to have been played by Frege's 1892 review ofthc published volume of PdA . A further contribution to the still-to-be-written history of Brentano's influence Upon ?Oth century philosophy is provided by lzydonl D:pnb~lca *~ e"-~ay on Brentano 's reception in Poland. It was, of course, Casimir Twardowski who was most instrumental here, Twardowski having been a student of Brentano who played a leading role in Pol5h philosophy, both through his own most important 195 student, lngarden, and through his founding of the analytic school of Lw6w. We shall see below, when commentmg on Chisholm\ contribution to the pr~nt volume, that the theory ot \\'holes and pam had a specialJy important funcuon il'l the thought of the later Brentano, and the question naturall} ari~ a:. to the possibility of connection:. between Brentano\ idea:. and the work of I c~n.ew&ki and his school in lhc same field. D~mbska suggests that here, too, Twardowski may have played a mediating role, Twardowski havmg delivered in Lw6w a course of lectures on reform-. of tradttionallogtc, dealing with the theories of Bolzano, Brentano. Boole and SchrOder. which Wll!t aucndcd by Lukll!tiCwicz and Kotarbinski, and by L~.->Snu:wskt, (p.l23). Brentano wa.c;. a' will ha\C already become clear. a devoted admirer of Ari!-ttOtle Rolf George's es,ay tn this volume consiMs of an attempt to measure the extent of Brentaoo's debt to Aristolle by meañ of a discusston of some of hiS exegetical writings. wnttng) whtch have. it seems, received li ttJe senous attenuon from Aristotle scholars. The essay centres on Brentano 's treatment of the question as to whether Aristotle's God. in contemplating himself, is or 1s not wholly ignorant of the world, and George shows how Brentano. by mean!> of an ingemous re-interpretation of the text, is able to suggest a solution both to th1s and to a ..cries of related ISl>UC~. As is well known, Brenuno divided percepuons into inner and outer, the two kmd' of pcrccptionl> ha'-1ng ru. thetr respecuve <>bJeC:ts physical phenomena such as colour-, sound-. or taste-Gestalten, and !)l>ychical phenomena-the mental acts of seeing, hearing, or tast1ng in which these Gestaftetl are grasped. In hts essay on Brcntano 's epistemology Guido Kung show!> that this dichotomy is nothing other than a modern-day Cartesiam~m. brought up to date wtth the tools of descriptive p~ychology. Thu:. Brentano's arguments for the dubitabilit) of outer perception parallel Descartes' discuss ons of perceptual illusions, and his claim'> for inner perception as a source of absolutely secure knowledge parallel Descarte.,* !learch for trutlb impervious to -.ystemaric doubt. Kung makes clear however that Brentano's dichotomy reflects important truths about our psychological experience quite independantly of any larger philosophical claim!> which may be formulated in its terms: in particular, that every consciousness is bound up with a self-con'>ciousness. the latter being abstractly distinguishable withtn the former as an act-moment of a quite peculiar kind. Since the faller can exist on I)' wtthin a larger. encompassing whole, it is to be distinguished e.g.: from every act of memory ll is these act-moments which Brentano calb mnerpercept1ons, and he JS rightly criticiLCd by Kung for running wgether t~o quite different kind:. of emit) by designating both as types of *perception' For it 1s clear that inner and outer 'perceptions' have a rad1cally different structure: as Kiing-followtng lngardensuggcsts, the former can most reasonably be regarded as acts of living tlwugh ( Durchleben ). without transcendent objecL'i corresponding to the targetGestalten of acts of outer perception. The same theme i5 tat..en further by F!Slle:.dal in hb contribution to the volume, a comparison of Brentano *~ theont!l> of intentionality and of perception wuh those of Husscrl. After careful consideration of the ~arious altemati'-C possible interpretations of Brentano's theory of 'intentional objects', F~llesdal comes to the conclusion-which comcides with that of Kung-that it is only with the help of something like Husserrs act-noema-object trichotomy that we can make sense or Brcntano 's descriptive p>ychological t'ramework. Brentano\ logical theoric-. arc di~cussed in contributions by Burnham Terrel and Stephan Komer. Philosophers of recent decade~ have learned to regard as a 196 paradigm of phil?SOphical logic _a th~ory ~uch ã R~sell'!> theory of de<,cnptiOñ which demands, tl we are to believe tn tt at all a radtcal separ.lUon of lngtc from the ()S}Chology of judging. deducing, arguing and thinking Pre~cnt-day philosophe~ will therefore find tt difficult to make themselves at home ~ithin Brcntano's logical ~Titings. since these present U'> ~ith a theo r) of judgment~ hich is. ã Terrell emphasises (p.45). embedded in a descriptive ps)chology . \\'ithtn such a framework even the most fundamental teneb of. for example, orthodox quantification theory are madmissible. Consider. for example. the a .. sertion that there are foxes in the wood. This we expect to be rendere*d a!. an exi.,tenuall} quantified conjunction, say: (Ex) (Fx & Wx). But thts is to imply that ~uch an ao;serllon rests, at some level, on a search through some inciUJsive value-range (of, say. animals), followed by a recognition that two specific sub-ranges of this value-range overlap. which is psychologically ab~urd The inadequacy of orthodox quantification-theoretic rendiñ is parttcularly apparent tn the case oi impersonal or *subject less' sentences such Cb ' It ts raining', 'It is \\ann', etc. For however much fonnal dexterity we mtght acqum: in translating these into sentences imolving quantification over, sa}. e\cnh or space-time intervals, there is surely no one \\ho would defend such translations as pro' iding an adequate rendering of~ hat i'> intended, psychologically. in the u'e of '>entenccs of the gi\'en type. The problem of such impero,onal sentences is of 'iUch intcrc!.t that it is a pity that Terrell should have dtrccted no specific attention to it in this issue, even though he mentions Brentano\ own work on the subject (p.47n) From the above it seems that a Brentani~t logician, in attempting to reconstruct logic, however much he found him1.elf utilising the insights of modem logic1ans. would decline the use of the quantification-theoretic devices which have become so familtar . nliS IS not to suggest however that there are nQ Brentanian insights ~hich are not '>U'>CCptible to quantification*thcoreuc interpn:tation. and the bulk of Terrell's paper is devoted to insights of this kind. particularly in relation to the frameworks of Lc:Snie~skian and substitutional quantification. Korner'!> paper on Brentano 's Rei<;m and cxisten.,•onallogjc also lies~ ithin thh field. He shows convinctngl) how Brcntano's analysis of judgments can be interpreted quite simply as resting on a certain '>Ub-system or first-order predicate logic, and he '\bows also how Brentano\ writings c.>n the concept of (phenomenological) continuum-recently published as Raum, Zeit und Kontimmm. (Hamburg, 1978, edited by Korner and Chisholm)-can be interpreted and made more precise within this framework. A more detailed discussion of Brentano*s analysis of temporal continua (both ph}1oical and phenomenological) is provided by Johann Gotsch! in his contribution to the volume. With the atd of modem logical tools. particularly the TarslJan conceptions of model and of truth. Paul Weingartner. in his paper. presenb an account of Bremano's cri!lctsm of the correspondence theor)* of truth. He sketches therewith some of the historical background-from Aristotle onwards-both to tht'> ts~ue and to the related problem of non-thmg-like entities, especially facts, Sachverhalte. truths in themselves, but mcluding also numbers. dasses. properties, all of which Brentano came to dismiss a!> fictitiou~. After pointing out that a (fonnal ontological) language useful for mathemati~ and philosopby must be of '>ccond order, i.e.: must allow quantification over 'higher-level entities', Weingartner points to one crucial question which mu.,t be answered by the Brentaman philosopher who wishes to deny the possibility of reference to such enuue.,: 197 Is it possible to reduce (translate) any judgement about entities of higher type (than individuals)-sa/va veritate,-to a judgment which either ãrt~ or deni~ the existence of some being in the proper (Brentanian) sense (i.e.: an individual or a substance)'! (p.l85). It is clear that amongst individuals of higher type are to be found also. according to Weingartner, Aristotelian accidents. Unfortunately Weingartner seems to hold the orthodox belief that the modem logician. with his theories of properties or classes, can achieve all that the Aristotelian might achieve by means ot a theory of accidents. As Angelelli has convincingly shown however, present-day logicians have succeeded in providing analogues of only some of Aristotle's fundamental ontological relationships. That is, they can translate, for example, a sentence such as 'this man is white' (say: 'W(a)'), or'swans are white' ('(x)(ifS(x) then W(x))') but they have no analogue of statements involving reference to concrete individual accidents, e.g.: specific whitenesses, or specific headaches, inhering concretely in specific individuals. The adoption of a formal ontology committed to such accidents would in fact throw a great deal of light on the problems dealt with by Weingartner in his paper. For it becomes possible to recognise a Sachverhalt (a positive, subsisting state of affairs) as a certain kind of concrete whole, formed of an individual substance and an accident which inheres in it; and then one bas the beginnings of a correspondence theory of truth. The modern philosophical theory which is closest to the Aristotelian substanceaccident theory sketched above is the Stumpf-Husserl theory of dependent and independent parts-of inseparable moments (including accidents) and separable pieces-presented most fully in Husserl's third Logical Investigation. Brentano, too, developed a related variant of Aristotle's theory, an impressive account of which is given by Chisholm in his contribution to the present volume. Brentano 's version of the theory begins with the claim that only things (individuals, substances) exist, and that therefore a philosophically adequate language will involve no reference to other kinds of entity. Now one example of an individual accident mentioned by Aristotle was the concrete individual knowledge (of, say. logic or Greek) inhering in a given subject (say S)-it is accidents of this type which are measured in, for example, university examinations. Intuitively it seems that it makes sense to refer to such accidents in and of themselves, and that such reference is possible without committing oneself to the view that the entities in question might exist apart from any appropriate substance. Yet given his prejudice in favour of thing-like entities Brentano will have no truck with views of this kind. He prefers. instead. to work within a theory which allows the designation exclusively of thing-like wholes, that is, in the given example, not only of S, but also of the 'larger' whole, S''. which is constituted when S acquires the given knowledge. Here S is in a certain sense a part of S' . even though there is nothing-in Brentano"s world-which when added to S in fact yields S1. Brentano now employs the term 'accident' to designate wholes of the latter kind. The resultant thesis, that an accident is a certain kind of whole containing its substance as part, will sound perverse to Aristotelian ears. Yet, as Chisholm shows, the theory-which is more subtle than I have perhaps been able to intimate here-is highly serviceable, allowing the precise formulation of a whole series of concepts (constituent, aggregate, boundary, ultimate substance, and so on). However only those who accept Brentano's fundamental ontological premise can feel completely happy with Chisholm's paper. What is needed is a comparison of Brentano 's theory with the closely related Stumpf-Husserl theory within which 198 rcfcrrncc tQ individual acc1dcnts in the origmal-.cñc remains po•"iblc. l'be role of language m Hrcntano's philo.,oph) is tl1-.cu~d in the contnbutton b\ Rudolf Haller. ~ho consu.lcr. in p;rrticular the problem of the mtcrdcpcnllence of language and thought He p.lint<.; out. ~ith Rrcntano. that it i, the language we grn\\ up\\ ith which ~upplit~ u' wtth the general phiiO\Ophi~ framc\\ork "•thin 'ol. hich \\C make sense ol the \\Orld. and funhcr that ordtnary language-the *volknprache*, asBrcntano called it,1'111\llk' u~ with a '~'11:',11 uf natural_clas~JtiCIIIoon• "hich y-c ~n cert .. inl> ochne and amcno.J. but v.ho-.c tm~1.' v.c can di~pen"~ v.1th only v.-1th d1fficulty. lur in the--e differentiation, ol ordmlll) Jañuage ... there 1' embedded the tno"' ledge of a time (p.212) A ppcab to thb (bngu•,tic) dJ\i,ion of (ephtcmologu:al) labour are lraught \\ith qutte .. ~cia I kmcb or danger. however. as both Brcntano_ ãd Wittgcnstem saw: we arc hublc to become bewitched m our thmkmg by linguiStiC mcchumsm-, which idh:. A' H<JIIcr shows, the details of the safeguard' ugainst this danger canva,M:d bv Brcntano and his student' (especially 'v'htrty and Twardow~ki) be;~r certain sinking imilarities to those of Wittgen<.tctn Uc goes on to )ohO\\ hov.; the Brentanian anal}'Sis or languotge had a direct mHucnce upon other Austrian thinker..,, partJCUiarl) Karl Buhler (p.215), \\hose OrganQn-Mod~/1 of hngui<.tJc acuons mlluenced in its turn the v.ork of Pop(>l:r. Th~ \olumc is rounded oft by a paper on Brent;~rx>'s antinaturali)otlc cthte!> b) Hemcr Rutte. and by two paper~ on Brent<tnu\ theory of will and emot1on by Anscmnbc and Geach. Brcntano, a:> is well known, dtvidcd psychical phenomena into three categonc-;, prc,cntattons, judgments, and 'phenomena of love and hate'. the latter oompmtñ both emotions and ach ol will. Both An"'omhc and Gcach adopt. perhap' unlnuv.ingly. \\hat ''ould have been 'Ccn a' the Ehrcnfcl!itan line m thc carl:r disputes on the subjecr. in that both reject Rrentano*~ running-together of \\til andemotlllO v.;tthtn a !>ingle catcgtll') . H<trry Smuh University ol Manchester RAUI(' \1 , PHE\O:\U:.'Ol.OG). ESS\\" l"i HÕOR Of' \1ARTI~ tit II)UiGt:R. edt ted b} John S.Uic.. Humantllc~ Pr6,, Atlanuc Highland,, I\ J .• 1978. 3l~pp Thts 'I.Oiume reprints eighteen essays from the journal Rttrurch in l 'he11omenology of IY77. ltts mtended as a tnhutc toHetdegger, v.ho hild died the p1c-.iou~ yc<~r. and conw .. t~ ol c\Say::. about him. T hree of the famous namc)o of Heidegg<!r -.cholar;hip-Mchta, Mul'l\ and Poggder-contribute "omcv.hat general pi~!cc, Sallis. under the title 'The Ongm~ of HcJdegger''> fhought". coñider~ not on I) the historical origi"', but al<;o the basic i ~ue and ' radicalongm' (der Zuspruch perhaps?) of ht!> thinktng. He gJ\CS a central place to He•dcgger\ phra-;e from I~ that "\I.e mu task \\hat remains unthought in the c-.sll 'to the thing it,.;lf " . l'hi:.t' hov. Salb nphc-.tte' the title olthl' book: "the gr\lUnd of the pos•;ibilit> (llthmg., shov.:ing thcm~he~". Fortunately the occãionul quality of these liN four essays is mis\lng trom the rcnwnder of the ~k. ~ collcclion of memorialle~turcs v.:ould, in the reading, ceal!C to honour thetr whjcct and become merely tcdtous. It IS the spcctali-,t e""a}s